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Essay
Family at the Birth of American Constitutional
Order
Mark E. Brandon*
I. Family in American Constitutional Law
In recent years, a number of observers of American politics, law, and
society have decried what seem to be fundamental shifts in the structure
and function of the family. According to some, these shifts, perhaps
reinforced by libertarian rulings from the nation's highest court, now
threaten the stability and maybe the survival of the political order.'
One of the most visible signs of libertarianism from the Supreme
Court, at least in the realm of the family, was Griswold v. Connecticut,2
which addressed the constitutionality of a state's policy prohibiting use of
* AssistantProfessor, Political Science, University of Michigan. B.A., University of Montevallo;
J.D., University of Alabama; M.A., University of Michigan; Ph.D., Princeton University. Thanks to
members of my Seminar on Family and Constitutional Order at the University of Michigan, Fall 1998,
for exploring ideas related to this Essay. Thanks also to Judith Failer, Howard Gillman, Mark Graber,
John Kang, Wayne Moore, and Arlene Saxonhouse for comments on an earlier draft. The American
Political Science Association provided an engaging forum at its 1998 Annual Meeting for presenting
a version of the Essay. Finally, I'm grateful to the Rackham School of Graduate Studies, the Office
of Vice President for Research, and the College of Literature, Science & the Arts-all at the University
of Michigan-for research support.
1. For strange bedfellows, see ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 133-39 (1996) (decrying the rise of radical egalitarianism and
radical individualism as undermining American culture and threatening its collapse) and MARY ANN
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 121-30 (1991) (suggesting
that modem trends in family operation are eroding the American democratic system). For earlier
commentators who expressed similar worries, albeit without explicit concerns about libertarian rulings
of the Court, see CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED
(1977) (arguing that the deterioration of the American family and its devastating effects on the social
order spring from corporate capitalism and bourgeois society, which have intruded upon the autonomy
of the nuclear family) and DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE
CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION 5 (1965) (reporting an overall deterioration in the structure of the
African-American family and arguing for greater legal reforms to assist African-American families).
2. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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certain contraceptives.3 In the climactic paragraph of his opinion for the
Court in Griswold, Justice Douglas located a right to contraception in a
specific institution-the marital family:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-
older than our political parties, older than our school system.
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any
involved in our prior decisions.4
Even putting aside the irony that Douglas partook of the enduring sacra-
ment with four different women, 5 this was curious rhetoric; at least it has
seemed so to me.
The curiosity that interests me here is not that there is a constitutional
right to privacy, nor that the right might include some sort of control over
reproduction, nor even that the right levitates in a jarring invocation of the
sacred. The curiosity in which I am presently interested concerns instead
the owner of the right. It would have seemed much cleaner-not to men-
tion more congenial to Douglas's libertarian leanings 6-to locate the right
in the individual. But Douglas shied away from an individualist rationale
for this aspect of the right to privacy.
Other justices have not been so shy. In Eisenstadt v. Baird,7 for
example, the Court hurdled questions of standing and outran the facts of
the case in order to extend the right to contraception to anyone, married or
not.8 Douglas resisted this move, claiming that the narrower and proper
3. Id. at 480. In another major case, Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, constructed a right
of substantive equal protection with respect to interests touching upon marriage and procreation. See
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that an Oklahoma statute
allowing for the sterilization of certain criminals did not withstand strict scrutiny).
4. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
5. See OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 235 (Kermit L.
Hall ed., 1992) [hereinafter OXFORD COMPANION].
6. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 241-43 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part)
(arguing that "mature" children have a right to participate in decisions about their education,
notwithstanding their parents' objections); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 463 (1971)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (urging that a nonreligious conscientious objector may not be "required to
kill" through military service in time of war); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 508 (1957)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (contending that the First Amendment bars punishment for obscene speech);
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U:S. 123, 174 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(arguing that an organization has standing under the Fourteenth Amendment to object to being labelled
"subversive" by the Attorney General). For a self-description of and justification for Douglas's
libertarianism, see WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS, 1939-1975: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF
WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1980).
7. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
8. Id. at 453.
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ground for decision was the First Amendment. The case, he said, con-
cerned the right to speak and teach about birth control. 9
Nonetheless, as the Supreme Court has crafted the right to privacy the
individualist rationale has prevailed, at least with respect to reproduction.
In Roe v. Wde,'0 the Court staked out a constitutional right of a woman,
married or not, to terminate a pregnancy by aborting the fetus." When
the decision was handed down, the extent of its individualist implications
was not clear. For one thing, the right itself appeared to be jointly owned
by the woman and her physician.' Moreover, as the progeny of Roe has
demonstrated, the precise boundaries of the right-and its fundamentality-
remained open to negotiation.' 3 But it seems clear now that the right,
9. Id. at 459 (Douglas, J., concurring). Mr. Baird had delivered a lecture at Boston University
on birth control and population. At the end of his talk, he distributed a sample of contraceptive foam
to a woman in the audience, for which he was arrested. Id. at 440. Handing out contraceptive foam,
said Douglas, did not diminish the relevance of the First Amendment. Distribution, he argued, was
not conduct but simply an effective communicative adjunct to Baird's lecture. Baird, after all, did not
actually use the device or incite another to do so. Id. at 455-60 (Douglas, J., concurring).
10. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
11. Id. at 164.
12. Id. at 163, 156, 163-64 (holding that, up to a certain stage in the pregnancy, "the attending
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regulation by the State, that,
in his medical judgment, the patient's pregnancy should be terminated").
13. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 189 (1973) (citing Roe as holding that a woman's right to
an abortion is not absolute); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (finding
that the precise limits to the right of privacy announced in Roe are unsettled, but that individuals plainly
have a right to make certain personal decisions free from unjustified governmental interference); Beal
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 480 (1977) (both upholding a state's
refusal to provide Medicaid coverage for nontherapeutic abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521
(1977) (finding no constitutional violation when a city provides hospital services for childbirth but not
abortion); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 381, 401 (1979) (striking down a Pennsylvania statute
as unconstitutionally vague because it imposed criminal liability on doctors that perform abortions),
overturned in part by Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (finding constitutional state and federal refusals to fund medically necessary
abortions); Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986) (stating that "the States are not free, under the guise of protecting maternal health or potential
life, to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies" and thus invalidating Pennsylvania's "informed
consent" requirements), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 833; Webster, 492 U.S. at 507 (upholding
a Missouri statute preventing the use of public employees and facilities for the performance of nonthera-
peutic abortions); Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1990) (upholding an
Ohio law requiring parental notice and allowing judicial bypass for minors seeking an abortion); Rust
v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (upholding Department of Health and Human Services's regula-
tions prohibiting programs funded under Title X from counseling patients regarding abortion or refer-
ring patients to abortion providers); Casey, 505 U.S. at 833 ("reaffirming" the "essential holding" of
Roe v. Wade). The imprecision of the right to abortion was due partly to the fluidity of the technology
presupposed by Roe's trimester test, and partly to changes in the Court's own makeup and therefore
in its normative and institutional commitments. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 61
(1976) (affirming that a woman and her physician have a right to make a decision about abortion
without interference from state regulation only during an early stage of the woman's pregnancy);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 494 (1983) (invalidating the portion of a
Missouri law which required that second-trimester abortions be performed in a hospital, but upholding
a requirement of parental or judicial consent, a requirement of a pathology report for all abortions, and
Texas Law Review [Vol. 77:1195
whatever its scope may be, is undeniably owned by the individual
woman. 14
In other doctrinal areas, however, the family has persisted as the
institutional location for a range of rights and privileges. 5 Thus, even if
who the family is and who may say so have frequently been subjects of
contention, 6 the family's importance as a constitutional institution seems
a requirement of two physicians for abortions performed after viability); Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462
U.S. 506, 519 (1983) (upholding a Virginia law requiring that second-trimester abortions be performed
in licensed outpatient clinics); Donald E. Batterson, A Trend Ephemeral? Eternal? Neither?: A
Durational Look at the New Judicial Federalism, 42 EMORY L.J. 209, 252 (1993) (arguing that a
change in the Supreme Court's composition led to an increase in concerns regarding federalism, with
the Court giving more power to the states, especially in cases involving privacy); Kristine E. Luongo,
The Big Chill: Davis v. Davis and the Protection of "Potential Life"?, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 1011,
1043-48 (1995) (arguing that technological advancements made the trimester test unworkable in many
cases and led to an erosion of women's right to abortion).
14. The Supreme Court has ruled that the husband-father may not restrict the exercise of the right.
See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 70. The most palpable limitation on the individ-
ualist approach concerns the conditions under which minors may exercise the right to abortion, indepen-
dent from their parents. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 899-900 (holding that a one-parent consent require-
ment and judicial bypass procedure are constitutional); Akron Ctr.forReprod. Health, 497 U.S. at 519-
20 (holding constitutional an Ohio statute that requires a physician to give notice to one of a minor's
parents prior to performing an abortion); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 450 (1990)
(invalidating a Minnesota law requiring parental consent from both parents for minors seeking an
abortion); Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 490-93 (holding that under the Missouri statute, a court could not deny
a minor's petition for abortion "for good cause" unless it had previously concluded that the minor was
not mature enough to make her own decisions); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc.,
462 U.S. 416, 452 (1983) (striking down portions of a city ordinance which required that first-trimester
abortions be performed in a hospital, mandated parental consent for every minor under the age of
fifteen, imposed a waiting period, and instituted vague procedures for disposal of fetal remains),
overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 870; H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981) (holding that a
Utah law requiring parental consent for abortion does not violate the constitutional rights of "an
immature, dependent minor"); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (striking down a
Massachusetts law requiring parental notification for every minor seeking an abortion, because the law
did not incorporate a judicial bypass procedure); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 72-75 (holding unconstitutional
a statute that required parental consent for a minor's abortion).
15. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125-27 (1989) (plurality opinion) (finding that
a California law which presumes that all children born in a marriage are children of the marriage
reinforces the integrity and privacy of the family unit); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91
(1978) (recognizing an individual's right to marry without unjustified interference from the state);
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494,506 (1977) (recognizing the constitutional significance
of familial relations beyond the traditional nuclear family); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
(restating the right to marry regardless of race); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925) (recognizing the right of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400-03 (1923) (respecting the right of individuals to teach foreign lang-
uages as well as the right of parents to permit it); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34
(1972) (respecting the religious right of Amish families to educate their children according to their way
of life).
16. See Michael H., 491 U.S. at 125 (plurality opinion) (addressing whether a natural father has
paternal rights to a child born during the mother's marriage to another man); Zablocki, 434 U.S. at
388-91 (recognizing an individual's right to marry free from unjustified interference from the state);
Moore, 431 U.S. at 506 (holding that a city ordinance may not confine the definition of "family" to
parents and their own children); see also, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding
1198
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to be fairly well established. But, again, it is not clear why this should be
SO.
This Essay-which is part of a larger work in progress concerning the
constitutional status of the family-offers a preliminary and partial explana-
tion and justification for the family's constitutional significance. The Essay
focuses on the family at the founding of the American constitutional polity.
With respect to the family, my aim is less to show the actual condition of
the family as a social institution than to reflect on its character as a political
idea. With respect to the founding, my aim is not to uncover the intentions
of the Framers in order to nail down a particular constitutional meaning,
but to understand some of the assumptions and choices that animated the
American order and hence to begin to come to terms with certain persistent
problems of constitutionalism.
My claims are essentially these: First, conceptions of the family
played an important role in imagining and establishing political authority
in England and in her colonies in North America. 7 Second, subtle shifts
in the character and function of the institution of the family engendered
basic changes in New World political ideology, especially with respect to
authority.'" Third, these changes in turn precipitated the separation of the
colonies from the mother country and eventually the establishment of sub-
stantially new political institutions. Sometimes explicitly and sometimes
not, assumptions about the character and function of the family were
important to both colonial secession and the eventual establishment of
constitutional order. In short, the roots of radical political change resided
unconstitutional Pennsylvania's statute placing a statute of limitations on the establishment of paternity);
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 434 (1984) (overturning a decree modifying custody, when the sole
basis for modification was the father's objection to the mother's interracial marriage); Pickett v. Brown,
462 U.S. 1, 18 (1983) (holding unconstitutional Tennessee's statute placing a statute of limitations on
paternity suits); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 101 (1982) (asserting that Texas's statute of limita-
tions on paternity suits denied illegitimate children equal protection); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S.
380, 394 (1979) (overturning a statute granting unwed mothers, but not unwed fathers, the right to
block the adoption of their children); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 356 (1979) (upholding
Georgia's statute denying illegitimate fathers the right to sue for a child's wrongful death); Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 273-76 (1978) (upholding New York's law barring an illegitimate child's right to
inherit when paternity was not established prior to death); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 775-76
(1977) (invalidating the Illinois law of intestate succession that allowed illegitimate children to inherit
only from their mothers); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 507 (1976) (upholding a statute condition-
ing inheritance upon dependency at the time of death); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164,
165 (1972) (holding that Louisiana may not subordinate claims of unacknowledged, dependent, illegiti-
mate children to claims of legitimate children under its workers' compensation laws); Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 539 (1971) (upholding a law subordinating the rights of an acknowledged
illegitimate child to inherit intestate); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (concluding that
barring a dependent illegitimate child's claim for wrongful death constituted invidious discrimination);
Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (recognizing the freedom to marry as a basic civil right).
17. See infra subpart II(A).
18. See infra subpart II(B).
1999] 1199
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with the family. 19 Fourth, however, there is evidence that the makers of
the Constitution imagined that family would play an important role in
preserving the republican forms of politics that the Constitution
entrenched.' Fifth, and I can be but suggestive on this point, both the
transformative function revealed in the Revolution and the preservationist
function imagined for the new constitutional order are crucial to
constitutionalism.2 ' Hence, the recent worry that changes in the family
augur substantial change in the political order may be justified.'
II. Philosophical and Social Roots
A. Seventeenth-Century English Political Thought
Almost all battles over the meaning of the American Revolution focus
on the problem of liberty. In one camp are proponents of modem liberty.
They claim that the colonial revolutionaries sowed the seeds of individual
liberty-seeds that antebellum Americans (especially abolitionists)
cultivated, that sprouted on the heels of civil war, and that eventually
flourished by the middle of the twentieth century.' In the other camp are
proponents of ancient liberty. They claim that the Revolution was predom-
inately about the capacity of people-with common experiences, ambitions,
and needs-to govern themselves.2 4  Predictably, the Declaration of
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part IV.
21. See infra Part V.
22. As addressed below in Part V, "transformative" refers to a tendency or inclination to abandon
or to alter fundamentally the principles, norms, or institutional arrangements of an existing constitution
or constitutional order. "Preservationist," in contrast, refers to a tendency or inclination to conserve
or maintain those principles, norms, or institutional arrangements.
23. Proponents of this view tend to focus on the first sentence of the first paragraph of the
Declaration of Independence: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal,
that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness." See, e.g., DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:
ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 16-17 (1978) (explaining that the liberal ideology
of the American Revolution focused new criticism on slavery in America); HARRY V. JAFFA, CRISIS
OF THE HOUSE DIVIDED: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE ISSUES IN THE LINCOLN-DOUGLAS DEBATES 28-
37 (1973) (discussing themes of liberty and slavery in the Lincoln-Douglas debates); WINTHROP D.
JORDAN, WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO: 1550-1812, at 342, 374
(1968) (focusing on the principles of liberty and equality as related to slavery following the American
Revolution); Walter F. Murphy, Slaughter-House, Civil Rights, and Limits on Constitutional Change,
32 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 19-20 (1987) (calling the Declaration of Independence the "founding document of
the American republic, committing the new nation to a radical political philosophy" of personhood).
24. See, e.g., MARK E. BRANDON, FREE IN THE WORLD: AMERICAN SLAVERY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FAILURE 195-96 (1998) (arguing that the revolutionaries' "claims were primarily
about self-government and the proper nature of representation under the British Constitution"); DAVID
BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION: 1770-1823, at 256 (1975)
(stating that the American Revolution was fought for self-determination); GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 132, 3-17 (1969) (noting the claim of
"Jefferson and others" that "the formation of new governments was the whole object of the
Revolution").
1200 [Vol. 77:1195
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Independence has figured prominently in these battles, but because it can
point toward either camp, it has not decided the conflict. Today the
modem libertarians may outnumber their opponents, but the war continues.
Conceding the importance of this conflict and its indirect relevance to the
concerns of this Essay, I want for now to consider an alternative theme of
the Revolution: the character and status of the family.
To set the stage, we should look first to seventeenth-century England,
where one familiar model for politics was distinctly familial. Specifically,
it was patriarchal. As Professor Schochet notes, explicitly patriarchal
conceptions were present, if not pervasive, in English political thought by
the end of the sixteenth century, with the accession of James I.' But the
systematic perfection of the political theory of patriarchy appeared in
Robert Filmer's defense of absolute monarchy.26 Filmer's strategy was
to ground political authority in tradition and nature and hence to protect it
from assault by upstart Parliamentarians, social contractarians, and
libertarians.27 What could be more traditional or natural than to link
politics to the all-but-ubiquitous institution of family? Drawing on the
Bible-another traditional and seemingly natural source for justification-
Filmer claimed that "[i]f we compare the natural duties of a father with
those of a king, we find them to be all one, without any difference at all
but only in the latitude and extent of them. "I
Moreover, said Filmer, political authority was essentially genealogical
in character; in fact, it grew out of a lineage running ultimately to
Adam.29 Filmer described the relationship as follows: "[K]ings are either
fathers of their people, . . . or usurpers of the right[s] of such fathers
.30 Later in the same discussion he explained:
It may seem absurd to maintain that kings now are the fathers
of their people since experience shows the contrary. It is true, all
Kings be not the natural parents of their subjects, yet they all either
are, or are to be reputed, as the next heirs [of] those progenitors who
were at first the natural parents of the whole people.3'
What this entailed for the scope and character of the king's authority
was axiomatic, precisely because the scope and character of paternal
25. See GORDON J. SCHOCHET, THE AUTHORITARIAN FAMILY AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES IN
17TH-CENTURY ENGLAND: PATRIARCHALISM IN POLITICAL THOUGHT 86-98 (2d ed. 1988).
26. See id. at 115-58.
27. ROBERT FILMER, PATRIARCHA, in PATRIARCHA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 4-6 (Johann P.
Sommerville ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1648).
28. Id. at 12.
29. It did not seem to bother Filmer that all persons, according to one story of Creation, might
trace their roots to Adam.
30. FILMER, supra note 27, at 2.
31. Id. at 10.
1999] 1201
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authority in the family seemed so self-evident. Kings "in their right
succeed to the exercise of supreme jurisdiction. And such heirs are not
only lords of their own children, but also of their brethren, and all others
that were subject to their fathers."32 Lest there be any question on the
matter, Filmer insisted that the king-whether he rose to his station as the
"true heir" of the father of the people, by usurpation, or by election-
possessed
the only right and natural authority of a supreme father. There is,
and always shall be continued to the end of the world, a natural right
of a supreme father over every multitude, although, by the secret
will of God, many at first do most unjustly obtain the exercise of
it.
33
Thus, if kings were obliged "to preserve the lands, goods, liberties
and lives of all their subjects," it was not because the laws of the realm
command it, but because it was "the natural law of a Father" that kings
"ratify the acts of their forefathers and predecessors in things necessary for
the public good of their subjects."' This obligation might have been
burdensome from the standpoint of the king, but for the fact that he was
the sole judge of the public good. Nor were there other limits on his
discretion. He was not constrained by his oath at coronation. Common
law did not bind him, as he was the "author, interpreter, and corrector of
the common law."'35 An act of Parliament could not direct him, as any
authority of Parliament derived from the will of the king; thus, "[t]he King
alone makes laws in Parliament."36 In all judicial cases, he was the
ultimate judge. Two notions followed from these claims. First, the king
was the source of all authority-executive, legislative, and judicial-in the
realm. Second, the king was not obliged to obey the law.
John Locke directly challenged Filmer's thesis on several fronts.37
As is now well known, Locke relocated the natural law, grounding it not
in a familiar social practice but in a hypothetical state of nature .3  This
32. Id.
33. Id. at 11.
34. Id. at 42.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 35.
37. In hisFirst Treatise of Government, Locke pressed a systematic critique of Filmer's patriarchy.
See generally JOHN LOCKE, FIRST TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
§§ 1-5, 141-43 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690). For purposes of this Essay,
I am more concerned with Locke's own positive account of political authority (and of family). See
generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,
supra, § 1-3, at 267, 267-68 [hereinafter LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE].
38. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 4-15. Locke left open the possibility that
the state of nature was not hypothetical, but real. As evidence for its reality, he cited relations among
1202 [Vol. 77:1195
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relocation permitted him to imagine nature as a domain of reason and a
source of limits. Reason and limits were captured in his conception of
natural law and natural rights.39 Locke's state of nature was a state of
perfect freedom and equality," but it was not a perfect state. For one
thing, the rights and limits of nature were insecure, in part because some
people failed to respect them.4' These failures were not always
intentional, however, for one thing that nature lacked was "an established,
settled, known law" capable of governing the particularities of human
relations.42  But whether violations were unknowing or intentional,
another thing nature lacked was "a known and indifferent Judge" with
power to enforce norms.43  Indifference was crucial because self-
enforcement could lead to excessive punishments.' Power was essential
because individuals in nature frequently lacked the capacity to carry out
punishments.45 To remedy these deficiencies in nature, people consented
by contract to the creation of government, thus giving up their natural
legislative and executive authority, but not abandoning limits per se.'
As with Filmer, family was central to Locke's conception of politics,
authority, and limits. But family as metaphor (and as institution) worked
differently for Locke than for Filmer. For example, in contrast with
Filmer's invocation of Adam as first father, Locke cited nature as "the
common Mother of all." 47 Filmer had claimed that political authority
mapped neatly onto authority in the family (or vice versa).48 In a sense,
Locke agreed, but the conclusion he drew from the mapping-that both
political and familial authority were limited-was plainly not what Filmer
had in mind. An unlimited parent, an arbitrary parent, was no parent. 49
Similarly, the sources and implications of Locke's principle of limits
were radically different from those of Filmer's absolutism. For one thing,
said Locke, it was a mistake to think of familial authority strictly as
nations, see id. § 14, the writings of Richard Hooker, see id. § 15, and the indigenous peoples of the
Americas, see id. § 49, ("Thus in the beginning all the World was America .... "). The state of
nature was also revealed in civil societies living under absolute monarchs who claimed to be above the
law. See id. §§ 93-94.
39. See id. §§ 6-8, 87. These connections are especially vivid in Locke's discussion of property.
See id. §§ 25-51.
40. See id. §§ 4, 87.
41. See id. §§ 7-8, 123, 128.
42. Id. § 124.
43. Id. §§ 125, 91, 125-26.
44. See id. §§ 13, 125.
45. See id. §§ 123, 126.
46. See id. §§ 87-90, 92-93, 95, 127-31.
47. Id. § 28.
48. See supra notes 26-36 and accompanying text.
49. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 53, 64.
1999] 1203
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"paternal"; better to call it "[p]arental," for the mother "hath an equal
[tjitle."50 Thus, authority to rule was divided and shared, not unitary or
strictly patriarchal. 5 For another, and this may be the most important
point for Locke, parental and political authority had fundamentally different
ends: "Political Power . . . I take to be a Right of making Laws with
Penalties of Death, and consequently all less Penalties."5 2  In contrast,
familial power aimed not at punishing but at nurturing. Its functions were
to protect the child, to provide for him, and to educate him intellectually
and morally. 3 Thus, the family's function was to bring the child into the
exercise of reason-a kind of self-limitation-and therefore to enable him
to live under law, which in turn would enable the child to be free, for
Lockean liberty was liberty under law.' Related to these observations,
the authority of parents and potentates differed also in that they acted upon
different subjects. Parental authority pertained to an uncomprehending
child not fully capable of participating in reason and therefore not able to
enjoy liberty." Political authority, in contrast, pertained to a compre-
hending adult who was capable of participating comprehensively in reason
and liberty.56
As these claims suggested, the fundamental purposes for the marital
relation itself were procreation and the rearing of children. 7 The
"natural" duration of that relation was the time required for "the
continuation of the species"-that is, the time it took to prepare children
to care for themselves. 8 Once the children flew the nest, however, the
natural imperative for the marital relation was at an end, and the marriage
was terminable "either by consent, or at a certain time, or upon certain
Conditions."59 In short, the marriage became contractual, for whether it
50. Id. § 52. Nonetheless, Locke persisted in referring to "paternal" authority. See, e.g., id.
§§ 65, 69, 71.
51. See id. § 52. He observed, moreover, that when mother and father disagree, the ultimate
decision "naturally falls to the man's share, as the abler and the stronger." Id. § 82. He also
employed Aristotle's hierarchy, which placed the family's members in rank order: "Master of a
Family[,]... Wife, Children, Servants and Slaves, united under the Domestick Rule of a Family."
Id. § 86 (emphasis in original).
52. Id. § 3 (emphases in original).
53. See id. §§ 56, 58, 65.
54. See id. §§ 55-65; see also supra note 46 and accompanying text. This notion, of course, cut
against that of Thomas Hobbes, an absolutist for whom liberty resided in "the absence of externall
Impediments" and "the Silence of the Law." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 91, 152 (Richard Tuck
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991) (1651).
55. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 55, 57-63.
56. See id. §71.
57. See id. §§ 77-78, 80.
58. Id. § 79. In this regard, Locke took into account the possibility that one couple might produce
more than one child during the marriage. See id. § 80.
59. Id. § 81.
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persisted or perished, it did so by consent.' Apart from the necessities
of natural obligation, then, the ties that bound the family were of two
types: As between husband and wife, the tie was basically contractual; as
between parent and child, the bond was one of caring and natural affection.
Whatever its duration, the marital family was profoundly implicated
in Locke's account of political authority. One of the basic problems of
politics, as Locke saw it, was that of sustaining limits to political (or, more
precisely, governmental) power.6" He supplied four solutions to that
problem. First, government should not violate the basic purposes for
which it was established, namely the protection of life, liberty, and estate-
or as Locke called them in aggregate, property.62 Second, when govern-
ment acts, it should adhere to basic precepts of what we might call "rule
of law." That is, government should act only through a public, known
law, adopted in accordance with the majoritarian principle, framed in
general terms applicable to all persons, and aimed at the public good.63
Third, drawing on Aristotle,' Locke intimated a distinction between
public and private domains-those domains inhabited or regulable by gov-
ernment and those that were not. He identified two essentially private
domains: property and family.65 With respect to property at least, its
"privacy" was severely restricted, as ownership and use of property were
subject to regulation by law.' Family, however, was autonomous to an
extent that property was not, for governmental jurisdiction over the marital
relation was confined to resolving "controversie that may arise between
Man and Wife about them."'67 For example, government might intervene
to protect the life or liberty of the wife, including her liberty to exit the
relationship.68 (Protecting her property was apparently not within the
purview of government.) Where procreation and the rearing of children
were concerned, however, the family was almost hermetically autonomous
from government. 69
60. On the emergence of a contractual conception of marriage, see Mary Lyndon Shanley,
Marriage Contract and Social Contract in Seventeenth Century English Political Thought, 32 W. POL.
Q. 79 (1979).
61. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
62. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 123, 131.
63. See id. §§ 96-98, 124-25, 131.
64. See2 ARISTOTLE, Politics, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 11.4.1262a25-1264b25,
at 1986, 2003-06 (Bollingen Series No. 71, Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (Revised Oxford Translation).
65. By "property" in this context, I intend those things, both real and personal, that persons can,
on Locke's terms, come to own. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 25-51. For
Locke's treatment of family generally, see id. §§ 52-95.
66. See id. §§ 89, 120, 131. For Locke's account of the mutation of limits as one moves from
the state of nature to civil society to civil government, see id. §§ 25-5 1.
67. Id. § 83.
68. See id. §§ 81-82.
69. See id. §§ 77-80.
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Related to the family's exclusive control over its children, the fourth
source of limits on governmental power was the distinction between society
and state.'0 This distinction was politically potent on Locke's terms,
because society possessed two residual powers. One was to establish
government anew when the standing government had dissolved, whether
by fundamentally altering the legislative power or by breaching its trust to
protect life, liberty, or estate. 7' The other was to resist government when
it became arbitrary or, again, when it systematically opposed itself to the
protection of life, liberty, or estate.72 But how would people in society
know when resistance was justified? The answer was twofold: (1)
"manifest evidence;"' and (2) a felt popular sense or opinion that the
standing government had engaged in a "long train of Abuses,
Prevarications, and Artifices" inconsistent with the public welfare or
safety.74 To that end, it was crucial that the family, not the state, control
the intellectual and ethical development of the child who would be citizen.
B. Colonial Transformation
Despite his repudiation of Filmer's patriarchy, Locke did not jettison
the relation between family and politics. Sometimes the relation was
analogical and mutually supportive and sometimes it was antagonistic, but
the connection between the two was central to Locke's constitutionalist
aspiration for politics. Nor did Locke explicitly challenge monarchy itself.
On the surface at any rate, he merely subjected monarchy to the limits of
reason, law, and popular judgment. Thus, aside from anticipatorily justify-
ing the Glorious Revolution, it was not clear to what other practical politi-
cal purposes Locke's theory might apply, at least in England. Certainly,
the more libertarian and egalitarian elements of Locke's philosophy did not
find fertile soil to grow there.75 But things were different in the colonies.
At first these differences were mainly in degree, not in kind; in any
event, as Locke's moderation suggested, they did not plainly portend a
repudiation of monarchy. In fact, in England the monarchy itself was
changing, due largely to the normative and institutional heritage of the
Glorious Revolution, after which the monarchy was held to be "mixed" or
70. See, e.g., id. §§ 240-243.
71. See id. §§ 211-220.
72. See id. §§ 221-222.
73. Id. § 230.
74. Id. § 225.
75. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, The "Higher Law" Background ofAmerican Constitutional Law, in
1 CORWIN ON THE CONSTITUTION 79, 117-39 (Richard Loss ed., 1981) (arguing that the doctrine of
parliamentary sovereignty restricted the utility of Locke's "higher law" in Britain, but that an alterna-
tive conception of sovereignty permitted his theory to flourish in the United States).
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"limited." 76  Gordon S. Wood calls it "republicanized. ' 7  Whatever one
calls it, the monarchy after the ascendancy of William and Mary was
different from that of the Charleses. Even so, life under monarchy
retained characteristics bearing a striking family resemblance to aspects of
Filmer's more absolutist model. 9  Patriarchal dependency, patronage,
hierarchy, disdain for labor and the marketplace, and commitment to kin-
ship all helped sustain and order the English social, economic, and political
world.' Thus, if the English system had elements of republicanism, it
was still at base a monarchy and not, in Montesquieu's words, "a republic,
disguised under the form of monarchy.""'
Much of what characterized English society-specifically, the tension
between republicanism and monarchy-was also present in the colonies,
even as late as the mid-eighteenth century.' But precipitous changes in
colonial life exacerbated social differences and altered basic political ideas,
which in turn intensified forces of division. Thus, while England flirted
with a brand of aristocratic republicanism congenial to monarchy, the
colonies surged to embrace a more radical and democratic brand of republi-
can norms and institutions.
Two important reasons for this colonial attraction were demographic
and economic. The population of the colonies was increasing dramatically,
doubling every twenty years during most of the eighteenth century.'
This increase was due partly to a natural, procreative rise in the existing
76. GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 98 (1992) ("Already
by the beginning of the [eighteenth] century the English monarchy had lost much of its sacred aura.").
As Wood suggests, some have referred to the English Constitution as "mixed." I WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *50-*51; see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE
DOWN: RADICAL IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION 14 (1975) (describing the English political
settlement as "[p]arliamentary sovereignty, limited monarchy, imperialist foreign policy, a world safe
for businessmen to make profits in"). See also generally BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 67-76 (1967) ("But if the theory [of a mixed constitution]
was evident and unanimously agreed on, the mechanics of its operation were not."); CORINNE
COMSTOCK WESTON, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY AND THE HOUSE OF LORDS, 1556-1832, at
87-141 (1965) (discussing the evolution of mixed government in England). Others have called it
"limited."
77. WOOD, supra note 76, at 98.
78. For an account of some of the constitutional changes presaged by the Glorious Revolution, see
generally J.R. TANNER, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS OFTHE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY, 1603-
1689 (1962).
79. See supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.
80. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 95-99.
81. BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 68 (Franz Neumann ed., Hafner Press
1949) (1748).
82. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 124.
83. See id. at 132; see also WILSON H. GRABILL El AL., THE FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN
5-12 (1958) (explaining the rapid growth of population during the eighteenth century); Daniel Scott
Smith, The Demographic History of Colonial New England, 32 J. ECON. HIST. 165, 174-79 (1972)
(exploring the reasons for fluctuations in the growth in population rate in New England during the
eighteenth century).
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population, but mainly to an extraordinary immigration, especially from
Britain and Western Europe.' 4 Migration within the colonies was also
extensive. The motives behind this movement varied greatly, but a domi-
nant motive was material. Some people fled creditors. Others simply
sought new venues to pursue advantage-whether on farms, in trades, or
through other sorts of ventures, such as speculation in land. 5 Prosperity
was becoming increasingly visible as a social fact and prominent as a
political value.86
The consequences of these conditions were substantial. If English
society valued leisure, stability, tradition, and order, colonial society was
increasingly marked by activity, mobility, innovation, and disarray.' In
contrast with the English system of dependency, patronage, and hierarchy,
the colonial system (if one could call it that) was largely one of
independence, initiative, and relative equality.8  It was not that social
differences did not exist in the colonies. But the distance between the
84. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 125.
85. See id. at 125-28.
86. The philosophical roots of prosperity as a political value extend back at least as far as Locke.
The evidence in this regard is not simply that Locke valued property, but that he tied its natural origins
to "labour" and that a principal aim of the political economy he depicted was to keep as much property
as widely in "use" as possible. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 25-51 (according
to my rough count, Locke invoked variants of the words "use" and "useful" seventeen times). In
relating the experience of Hector St. John de Crevecoeur, a Norman-French scientist who captured his
experience in the American colonies as a corresponding member of the Academie de Sciences and the
Royal Agricultural Society of Paris, Vernon Parrington noted that the pursuit of economic independence
and material security were plainly motives for immigration to the North American colonies; but more,
industry and enterprise became part of what it was to be "an American." 1 VERNON L. PARRINGTON,
MAIN CURRENTS IN AMERICAN THOUGHT: THE COLONIAL MIND, 1620-1800, at 143-47 (1927). In
the words of Crevecoeur, "Go thou, and work and till; thou shalt prosper, provided thou be just,
grateful and industrious." Id. at 145.
Pauline Maier argues that the invocation of "happiness" in Thomas Jefferson's Declaration of
Independence was preceded by similar declarations of various individual colonies, declarations which
explicitly tied pursuit of happiness to security, liberty, and property. See PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN
SCRIPTURE: MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 165-67 (1997). In fact, the sources for
Jefferson's usage were more complex than Maier allows. See, e.g., GARRY WILLS, INVENTING
AMERICA: JEFFERSON'S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 248-55 (1978). Maier's observation,
however, does support the claim that, by the time of the Revolution, at least in some colonial quarters,
the political idea of happiness was linked to material concerns. See generally Jeffrey Bamouw,
American Independence: Revolution of the Republican Ideal; A Response to Pocock's Construction of
The Atlantic Republican Tradition, in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
CULTURE 31 (Paul J. Korshin ed., 1986) (claiming that the principal idea animating American revolu-
tionary thought was that of economic expansion).
By the time the Constitution was ratified, in fact, prosperity was so highly valued that the
material success following ratification was a substantial reason for Americans' widespread (even
reverent) acceptance of the Constitution. See Corwin, supra note 75, at 80; MICHAEL KAMMEN, A
MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 14-16 (1986).
87. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 124-34 (describing the instability of the American social
hierarchy resulting from the growth and movement of the population).
88. Cf. id. at 112-17 (noting that aristocracy was essentially nonexistent in America compared with
the intensely hierarchical social structure in England).
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highest and lowest orders was strikingly shorter there than in England,
because the colonies lacked both the extravagant wealth and the masses of
destitution so prevalent in Europe.89 Certainly, there was a kind of
aristocracy in America, but it tended to be weak and unexalted, its
boundaries were permeable, and in any event it was not the titled sort of
aristocracy found in England.' °
One crucial arena in which these differences played themselves out
was the family. The ability of individuals-especially young men-to
strike out and seek their own way in the New World not only weakened the
English system of patronage, 9' but also loosened the bonds of family
itself. Married women left their husbands; in some colonies they left under
protection of law, as the law of divorce was consistently more liberal in the
colonies than in England.' Children also left home, and many insisted
on choosing their own partners for marriage, even when such choices flew
in the face of traditional demands to sustain (or improve) one's family's
pedigree.93 These new freedoms meant that, in purely practical terms, it
was impossible for many colonial fathers-especially among the gentry-to
assert the kind of absolute authority that Filmer had insisted was part of the
nature of things. Thus, instead of relying exclusively on dependency and
command to rule the family, fathers increasingly found affection and nego-
tiation more effective for sustaining authority.'
These social changes were the first steps toward producing and priva-
tizing what we now know as the American model of the nuclear family.95
89. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 122.
90. See id. at 112-24 (examining the ways in which the social hierarchy of the American colonies
differed from England's social structure). The evolution of the American economy was one of the
powerful forces causing colonial society to become even less stratified and less like the traditional
English social hierarchy. See id. at 134-45; BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS
131-32 (1968) (explaining that in the American colonies there was neither a traditional aristocracy nor
a clear legal distinction between members and nonmembers of the middle order); cf. WOOD, supra note
24, at 488, 488-89 (noting that to a European, "American society may have appeared remarkably
egalitarian," but many Americans felt as if there were sharp class divisions).
91. See WOOD, supra note 76, at 114-15, 174-76. Bailyn focuses on the political origins of the
demise of the English system of patronage in the colonies. See BAILYN, supra note 90, at 28-30, 72-
80. This focus, however, need not negate the importance of social underpinnings for political change.
92. See Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century
Massachusetts, 33 WM. & MARY Q. 586, 588-89 (1976) (explaining England's strict policy on divorce
and comparing it to the less stringent policies of provincial Massachusetts).
93. See Daniel Scott Smith, Parental Power and Marriage Patterns: An Analysis of Historical
Trends in Hingham, Massachusetts, 35 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 419, 425 (1973) (noting the lack of signi-
ficant parental involvement in marital decisions during the eighteenth century).
94. See DANIEL BLAKE SMITH, INSIDE THE GREAT HOUSE: PLANTER FAMILY LIFE IN
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHESAPEAKE SOCIETY 52-53, 111-13 (1980) (describing how the traditional use
of force in childrearing gave way); WOOD, supra note 76, at 145-50 (describing the breakdown of tradi-
tional patriarchal relationships, particularly the relation between parents and children, and the develop-
ment of new approaches to such relationships).
95. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8, 8-20 (1980) ("[W]hat today we speak of as the modem American
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Jay Fliegelman calls these incipient forms of family a "revolution against
patriarchal authority." 96  This characterization is suspicious, not least
because if this were a revolution, it was one of the longest, slowest
revolutions in human history, for paternal authority persisted, even as the
devices for asserting it changed. Nonetheless, the social changes
Fliegelman addresses were deeply significant on their own terms, and they
portended still greater changes in political ideology.
III. The Revolution
Especially after English troops defeated French and Indian forces in
1763, thus extending and (so the colonists thought) securing for settlement
the western frontier in North America, colonists became more and more
restive. Like women and children in the family, they became increasingly
difficult to govern according to established modes. Around the same time,
political rhetorical uses of family began to change. In some quarters, the
new uses remained superficially similar to the old. Blackstone, for
example, could continue to invoke an image of "the king, as pater-familias
of the nation."97  Colonists, too, employed this image.98  Even in
England, however, the metaphor of king as father was undergoing a signi-
ficant shift in meaning, away from patriarchy and toward a regime of
reciprocal obligations between father and child. 99
Perhaps more significantly, both in England and in the colonies,
people began using an alternative familial metaphor-not the king as father,
but the country as parent, even as mother. If this revision suggested a
distinct softening of the authoritarian rhetoric of patriarchy, it did not
necessarily absolve the children of obedience. Hence, both English
family emerged first in the years between the American Revolution and about 1830."). In fact, the
social changes were among the first indications of an alteration of the family-including the role of
children and the relationship between parents and children-throughout the Western world. See
PHILIPPE ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF FAMILY LIFE 402-04, 412-13
(1962) (claiming that affectionate care for children was the basic indicator of the emergence of the
"modem" family).
96. JAY FLIEGELMAN, PRODIGALS AND PILGRIMS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AGAINST
PATRIARCHAL AUTHORITY, 1750-1800, at 267 (1982).
97. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *127; see also JERRILYN GREENE MARSTON, KING AND
CONGRESS: THE TRANSFER OF POLITICAL LEGITIMACY, 1774-1776, at 24, 20-31 (1987) (examining
the different arguments for executive authority, which included the invocation of the King as the "'royal
father' of the national and imperial community," advanced by the political theorists such as Blackstone).
98. See PETER SHAW, AMERICAN PATRIOTS AND THE RITUALS OF REVOLUTION 39 (1981) (noting
that leading colonial patriots used a popular metaphor-that the "people 'humbly look up to his present
Majesty... as children to a father"--in order to placate the King's fear of a potential colonial revolt);
WOOD, supra note 76, at 165-67 (discussing the prevalent use of the parent-child image by both Whigs
and Tories to describe the imperial relation between the colonies and England).
99. See Edwin G. Burrows & Michael Wallace, The American Revolution: The Ideology and
Psychology of National Liberation, 6 PERSP. IN AM. HIST. 167, 186-89 (1972).
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officials and colonial monarchists exhorted colonists to behave, because
that was simply the duty that children-the colonies-owed the "mother
country," who after all had nurtured her children as any good mother
would do."° But the softness of the revised metaphor made it especially
useful to those sympathetic to the colonial cause, who argued that the
mother country should exercise forbearance toward her colonies.' '
Ultimately, however, this maternal modification of the familial
metaphor failed to convince a number of influential colonists, among whom
was Thomas Paine. On the eve of the Revolution, he attempted to wrest
the maternal image from English hands and turn it against them in such a
100. See Ian R. Christie, British Response to American Reactions to the Townshend Acts, 1767-
1770, in RESISTANCE, POLITICS, AND THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR INDEPENDENCE, 1765-1775, at
193, 198 (Walter H. Conser, Jr. et al. eds., 1986) ("'I heartily wished to repeal the whole law
[imposing a duty on tea] ... if there had been a possibility of repealing it without giving up that just
right which I shall ever wish the mother country to possess, the right of taxing the Americans.'"
(quoting 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 854 (1770) (statement of Lord North))); id. at 207 ("[A]II measures for
the support of the constitutional Authority of this Kingdom in Massachusetts Bay will be ineffectual and
delusive, until[] the Government of that Province, upon just Principles of dependency on the Mother
Country, can be restored to its proper vigour and activity." (quoting Letter from the Colonial Secretary
to General Thomas Gage (June 12, 1770), in 2 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF GENERAL THOMAS GAGE
WITH THE WAR OFFICE OF THE TREASURY, 1763-1775, at 103, 103 (Clarence Edwin Carter ed., 1931-
33))); Soame Jenyns, The Objections to the Taxation of our American Colonies, Briefly Considered,
reprinted in THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION THROUGH BRITISH EYES 6, 8 (Martin Kallich & Andrew
MacLeish eds., 1962) (1765) [hereinafter AMERICAN REVOLUTION] ("[Clan there be a more proper
time for this mother country to leave off feeding out of her own vitals, these children whom she has
nursed up... ?"); WOOD, supra note 76, at 165-67 (noting the prominence of the parent-child analogy
to the relationship between England and the American colonies).
Even John Dickinson, a colonist and eventually a revolutionary, implored, "Let us behave like
dutiful children who have received unmerited blows [in the form of the Townsend Acts] from a beloved
parent. Let us complain to our parent; but let our complaints speak at the same time the language of
affliction and veneration." JOHN DICKINSON, LETTERS FROM A FARMER IN PENNSYLVANIA TO THE
INHABITANTS OF THE BRITISH COLONIES, LETTER III (Dec. 14, 1768), reprinted in EMPIRE AND
NATION 15, 20 (William E. Leuchtenberg & Bernard Wishy eds., 1962).
101. See 2 PARL. HIST. ENG. 165 (1766) (statement of Lord Camden) ("The forefathers of the
Americans ... looked for protection, and not for chains, from their mother country."), reprinted in
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 24, 28; Petitions of the London Merchants Against the
Stamp Act (Jan. 17, 1766), 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. 133 (1766) (urging the repeal of the Stamp Act in
order to promote among the colonies a "firma attach[ment] to the mother country"), reprinted in
AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 16, 18; William Pitt, Addressing the House of Lords in
Opposition to the Quartering Act (May 27, 1774), in 3 ANECDOTES OF THE LIFE OF THE RIGHT
HONORABLE WILLIAM PITT, EARL OF CHATHAM 18, 100 (John Almon ed., 1792) [hereinafter ANNALS]
("The Americans had almost forgot, in their excess of gratitude for the repeal of the stamp act, any
interest but that of the mother country."), reprinted in AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 41,
42; William Pitt, Speech on the Stamp Act (1766), in ANNALS, supra, at 365 ("The Americans are the
sons, not the bastards of England."), reprinted in AMERICAN REVOLUTION, supra note 100, at 10, 11;
RICHARD PRICE, OBSERVATIONS ON THE NATURE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, THE PRINCIPLES OF
GOVERNMENT, AND THE JUSTICE AND POLICY OF THE WAR WITH AMERICA 37, 104-05 (8th ed. 1778)
(criticizing at one point the claim that England was "the PARENT STATE," while at another point
urging a strategy of forbearance in order to engender "submission to the Mother-country"), reprinted
in Two TRACTS ON CIVIL LIBERTY (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1972).
Texas Law Review
way as to obliterate the metaphor entirely. 2 If England be the mother
country, Paine wrote,
the more the shame upon her conduct. Even brutes do not devour
their young, nor savages make war upon their families. . . . This
new world has been the asylum for the persecuted lovers of civil and
religious liberty from every part of Europe. Hither have they fled,
not from the tender embrace of the mother, but from the cruelty of
the monster .... 103
Two years later, in a pamphlet addressed to the "People of England,"
Paine returned to the familial theme, insisting that England might have
governed the colonies better had she studied more intensively "the domestic
politics of a family.""° But the time was too late for correction, he said,
again for reasons touching on the nature of the family, or at least the
family as Locke had conceived it and as it was actually emerging in
America. Paine explained:
[A]s in private life, children grow into men, and by setting up for
themselves, extend and secure the interest of the whole family, so in
the settlement of colonies large enough to admit of maturity, the
same policy should be pursued and the same consequences would
follow. Nothing hurts the affections both of parents and children so
much, as living too closely connected, and keeping up the distinction
too long. 0 5
Children must eventually "have families of their own."" °  Command
cannot hold them. Pressing for a new parental role for the emerging
polity, Paine urged:
It is now the interest of America to provide for herself. She hath
already a large and young family, whom it is more her duty to take
care of, than to be granting away her property, to support a power
who is become a reproach to the names of men and Christians. 07
Having seized the rhetorical trope, Paine turned his attention to social,
political, and economic reality. The American Revolution and eventually
the revolution in France, he argued, were largely about establishing a new
102. Paine was not the first to wage a pitched battle against even the maternal metaphor. For a
discussion regarding his predecessors, see Burrows & Wallace, supra note 76, at 190-211.
103. THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776), reprinted in THOMAS PAINE: COLLECTED WRITINGS
5, 22-23 (Eric Foner ed., 1995) (emphasis in original).
104. THOMAS PAINE, THE CRISIS, NUMBER VII (1778), reprinted in COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra
note 103, at 191, 207.
105. Id. at 206-07.
106. Id. at 207.
107. PAINE, supra note 103, at 48 (emphasis in original).
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conception of the character and place of family in political society.' 8
Paine's enemy, most simply, was a system in which privilege, property,
and power were determined by inheritance."°  Its beneficiaries, of
course, were the aristocracy and ultimately the monarchy. Paine waged a
two-pronged assault on this system, one immanent and one external.
The immanent critique took two forms. The first, which aimed at the
heart of Filmer's defense, was biblical. The only permanent succession
recognized "in or out of scripture," Paine insisted, concerned original sin,
which all persons inherited equally and from which "hereditary succession
can derive no glory." l ' The second focused on the historical record.
Hereditary succession to the throne of England was little more than fanciful
myth, said Paine. The story of English monarchy was a story not of kin-
dred blood but of bloody conquest, in which families fought one another
for the right of succession."' One could see this in the historic contests
between the Yorks and Lancasters and later between the Stuarts and
Hanovers. l1 2  Contrary to Edmund Burke's reflections," l3 Paine insisted
that "there is no English origin of kings,"" 4 for even the mythic line of
succession begins with "William the Conqueror, as a conqueror.""
l5
Thus, the English self-conception of a seamless and timeless succession
was a lie, and noble titles and the laws of inheritance aimed merely to
disguise the truth and hence to preserve the "conquest."" 6
Paine's external critique emphasized the bad consequences of heredi-
tary monarchy, which is to say its incompatibility with things he valued.
Borrowing from Locke's account of the state of nature but extending the
normative implications of the metaphor, Paine argued that hereditary
succession violated nature's basic precepts:
[A]ll men being originally equals, no one by birth could have a right
to set up his own family in perpetual preference to all others forever;
108. See generally id.; PAINE, supra note 104.
109. See PAINE, supra note 103, at 15-16.
110. Id. at 17.
111. Id. at 293-95; see also THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE, ON THE KING OF ENGLAND'S
SPEECH (1782), reprinted in COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra note 103, at 287, 293-95 (recounting the
battle for the throne of England between the Stuart family and the House of Hanover).
112. See PAINE, supra note 111, at 4.
113. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 216-18
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., Hackett Publishing Co. 1987) (1790) (challenging the manner and aims of the
French Revolution and defending the English system of hereditary succession).
114. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN PART ONE (1791), reprinted in COLLECTED WRITINGS,
supra note 103, at 433, 476.
115. Id. at474, 474-76 (emphasis in original). This claim especially resounded among Americans,
because, in Whiggish fashion, Americans tended to claim that English liberty had actually existed
among the Anglo-Saxons, but was lost with the imposition of the Norman yoke. See FORREST
McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGIN OF THE CONSTITUTION 76-77
(1985).
116. PAINE, supra note 111, at 478, 478-79.
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and though himself might deserve some decent degree of honors of
his co-temporaries, yet his descendants might be far too unworthy to
inherit them. 11
7
In short, "nature disapproves [hereditary monarchy], otherwise she would
not so frequently turn it into ridicule by giving mankind an ass for a
lion. "11
8
Aside from its being incompatible with nature's precept of equality,
Paine believed monarchy suffered from four other defects. First, what
nature anticipated was for intelligence, wisdom, and ability to rise to the
top. She did not, however, assign these virtues to a few fortunate families;
instead she distributed them randomly across "every family of the
earth."" 9  As nature anticipated, so should human institutions have
followed. But government by inheritance subverted nature's beneficence
and made government itself incompetent.,20
Second, Locke had claimed that the legitimacy of government
depended on the consent of the governed. Again, this standard did not
prohibit monarchy, for according to Locke it was sufficient that consent be
tacit, evidence of which was fairly easy to muster. 2t Paine took Locke's
notion of consent and pushed it one step further, insisting that hereditary
monarchy was inherently nonconsensual and therefore unavoidably
despotic. There were two forms of hereditary succession, said Paine: one
in which a family "establish[ed] itself with hereditary powers on its own
authority " ' and another in which a particular family was invested with
such powers by the nation."2 The first, he said, was clearly despotism,
for it lacked any semblance of consent. The second might have seemed
permissible, but it too was ultimately despotic, for "[i]t operates to
preclude the consent of the succeeding generations. " 4 Parents, Paine
argued, may not bind their children in this way. Nor could it be said that
children may somehow anticipatorily devise their rights to their forebears:
"If the present generation, or any other, are disposed to be slaves, it does
not lessen the right of the succeeding generation to be free; wrongs cannot
have a legal descent.""z
Third, hereditary monarchy confused the public good with familial
interest. The concern of government, Paine insisted, should be the affairs
117. PAINE, supra note 103, at 16 (emphasis in original).
118. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
119. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN, PART TWO, reprinted in COLLECTED WRITINGS, supra
note 103, at 541, 563, 562-63.
120. See id. at 562-64.
121. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 106-07.
122. PAINE, supra note 114, at 517.
123. See id.
124. Id. at 518.
125. Id.
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of the nation as a whole. Government, then, ought to be the property of
"the whole community."126 But hereditary succession debased govern-
ment by making it "the property of [a] particular man or family" and in
doing so created "a permanent family interest ... whose constant objects
are dominion and revenue."1 27
Fourth, in promoting dominion and revenue, the English system pre-
served the fruits of conquest, but perverted the proper relation between
property and family. At the heart of that system was the law of
primogeniture, under which property descended to the eldest son, to the
exclusion of other children.128 Primogeniture thus concentrated the bulk
of a family's property and title in a single set of hands. Such a regime,
Paine argued, was inconsistent with natural justice: "Establish family
justice, and aristocracy falls. By the aristocratical law of
primogenitureship, in a family of six children, five are exposed.
Aristocracy has never more than one child. The rest are begotten to be
devoured." 129
Aside from violating principles of natural justice, said Paine, this
arrangement was problematic for its pernicious consequences. Much of
republican thought in the eighteenth century was preoccupied with the
problem of virtue. 13  Republican institutions, the thinking went, were
sustainable only among a virtuous citizenry. But what made for a virtuous
citizenry? According to an agrarian strand of republicanism, virtue implied
manliness; and, as Forrest McDonald points out, "manliness meant
independence."'3' Independence in turn required that a man own enough
unencumbered land to be able to meet the material needs of his family.
Thus independence, which would soon become the foundation for full
citizenship, signified not the solitary or unattached individual but the
person whose autonomy grew out of his connection to the soil (i.e.,
126. Id. at 536, 536-37.
127. PAINE, supra note 119, at 562.
128. See generally ALLISON REPPY & LESLIE J. TOMPKINS, HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY
BACKGROUND OF THE LAW OF WILLS 68-78 (1928).
129. PAINE, supra note 114, at 478.
130. On the relations among republicanism, virtue, and eighteenth-century American thought, see
for example JOYCE APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION 161-
87 (1992); PATRICE HIGONNET, SISTER REPUBLICS: THE ORIGINS OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN
REPUBLICANISM 107-20 (1988); MCDONALD, supra note 115, at 70; THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT
OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE 112-27 (1988); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION 519-29 (1975); PAUL A. RAHE,
REPUBLICS ANCIENT AND MODERN: CLASSICAL REPUBLICANISM AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
600-05 (1992); M.N.S. SELLERS, AMERICAN REPUBLICANISM: ROMAN IDEOLOGY IN THE UNITED
STATES CONSITUTION 235-36 (1994).
131. MCDONALD, supra note 115, at 74. This strand, which traced its intellectual pedigree to
James Harrington's OCEANA, was especially strong in the Southern colonies. Id. (citing JAMES
HARRINGTON, THE COMMON-WEALTH OF OCEANA (J. Streater 1977) (1656)).
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production) and to family (i.e., reproduction). Primogeniture undermined
this social system of virtue by unduly constraining the distribution of
land. 132
Paine advocated two sets of policies designed to break up the "vast
estates" of the aristocracy and to redistribute its wealth.'33 One was to
require that landed estates be allocated "among all the heirs and heiresses
of those families," 131 including "poor relations" and not just the favored
few (or one). 135  This, he said, would go a long way toward redistribu-
ting land "back to the community.", 36  The other policy was to enact a
system of taxation, extraordinary for its time, that would supply revenue
for three basic purposes: (1) to support the poorest families; (2) to
underwrite the education of children of poor and middling families; and (3)
to provide for the aged, a provision "not of the nature of a charity, but of
a right." 17  These policies would strengthen republicanism by ensuring
a wider distribution of property and hence of the structural guarantee of
independence and virtue. By educating the young, they would increase the
prosperity of the nation and supply the sole foundation for the "character"
of individuals. 1
38
Paine offered these policies for the reform of England and the
European Continent. Perhaps he imagined they were simply unnecessary
in America, for even before the Revolution some of the practices Paine
found most objectionable were weakening, and after the Revolution most
were obliterated. Feudal land tenures, which were basic to the English law
of property, had never been widespread in the colonies, where almost all
title to land was held in fee simple."' New England had abolished
132. See id. at 73-75. This strand of republicanism makes sense of Paine's critique of "the state
of the currency," in which he was concerned that a man be able to "support his family as long again
as before [the crisis]." THOMAS PAINE, THE AMERICAN CRISIS III (1977), reprinted in COLLECTED
WRITINGS, supra note 103, at 116, 143. Agrarian republicanism collided with republican thought in
Puritan New England, which held that public virtue could be sustained not through social and political
structure, but only through the presence of privately virtuous individuals. See id. at 144-46. This
different conception would become useful in New England's transition from an agrarian to a
commercial and industrial capitalist economy and in permitting what some would consider the
"unnatural" accumulation of wealth that capitalism entailed. See generally DANIEL BELL, THE
CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21 (20th Anniversary ed. 1996); JOSEPH ALOIS
SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 156-63 (Tom Bottomore ed., Harper& Row
1976) (1942); MAx WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 153-83 (Talcott
Parsons trans., C. Scribner's Sons 1930).
133. See PAINE, supra note 119, at 639, 624-41.
134. Id. at 639.
135. Id. at 636.
136. Id. at 639.
137. Id. at 628, 624-31.
138. Id. at 614, 630-31.
139. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OFAMERICAN LAW 234 (2d ed. 1985) (observing
that state legislatures began to dismantle feudal land law shortly after the Revolution).
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primogeniture in the seventeenth century, though the Southern colonies
continued to recognize it up to the Revolution." Fee tail, which tied
title exclusively to lineal descendants, was dead or dying in America by the
end of the eighteenth century, when state legislatures completely abolished
the remnants of feudal incidents.'
4 1
Inheritance of property and tenures in land were not the only domains
in which English law touched the family. In the domain of criminal law,
forfeiture and attainder were penalties under English law for treason and
certain other capital crimes. 42 Both worked "corruption of blood,"
which meant not only that the convicted or attainted person must forfeit his
own real and personal property, but also that he could neither transmit his
property to his heirs nor inherit from his ancestors.' 43  The theory,
plainly enough, was that his family's blood was corrupted-a reversal of
familial privilege, a kind of familial curse. The consequence was that the
family's relevant property reverted to the Crown. Even before the
Revolution, Virginia, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania ameliorated the harsh-
ness of these penalties, the latter two by abolishing corruption of blood
altogether. 144
Most important, however, was the effective absence of aristocracy in
the colonies. Again, this is not to say there was no social or economic
differentiation among people. New England had its "high-born" and the
Southern colonies their planter class long before the American secession
from Britain. But, as I have already suggested, American aristocracy was
different, and the upshot of the difference was that its members possessed
no inherent claim to rule others. 45
In 1791, Paine praised the revolutions in America and France for
rejecting aristocratic familial systems and embracing principles "calculated
to call forth wisdom and abilities, and to exercise them for the public good,
and not for the emolument or aggrandizement of particular descriptions of
men or families."" The revolutions, he said, had "renovat[ed] .. .the
natural order of things."' 4" This notion of renovation was truer in
France than in what would become the United States, for many of the prin-
ciples of the American Revolution merely reinforced trends that had been
present for decades in the colonies. 148  Even so, the separation of the
140. See id. at 66.
141. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 139, at 239; MCDONALD, supra note 115, at 12.
142. See McDONALD, supra note 115, at 20-2 1.
143. Id. at 20.
144. See id. at 20-2 1.
145. See BAILYN, supra note 76, at 274-75.
146. PAINE, supra note 111, at 537-38.
147. Id. at 537.
148. See subpart II(B).
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colonies from the mother country did entrench certain solutions to prob-
lems concerning the family in the polity. In doing so, it created a new set
of problems for the new country to deal with.
IV. A Republican Family
A. Institutional Form and Political Liberty
The new problems concerned the form(s) in which politics would be
conducted. Aristotle had observed three desirable political constitutions in
the world: kingship (monarchic rule by one person for "the common
interest"), 49 aristocracy (rule by a few good persons for the good of "the
state and all its members"), 5 ' and polity (rule "by the mass of the
populous in the common interest").' He compared those forms with
three "deviations": tyranny, oligarchy, and democracy. 152  In the end,
however, Aristotle did not make much of these forms. For one thing, he
abandoned them almost as quickly as he took them up, turning his attention
instead to social and economic elements such as the distribution of
wealth.' 53 For another, he seemed unable to fathom how rule by the
many might constitute a desirable regime. 54
Writing two centuries later, Polybius purported to solve that problem
by embracing a form that Aristotle only briefly flirted with, the "mixed
constitution. "'155 Originating in Lycurgus's constitution for Sparta,'56
this form combined elements of each of Aristotle's three desirable regimes.
In Polybius's day, the mixed constitution was visible in the institutional
design of the Roman empire."' 7 Its virtues were threefold: It embodied
an aesthetic quality of balance; as the Romans demonstrated, it was
remarkably successful in extending rule over a large expanse of territory;
and, because it was resistant (though not immune) to "natural forces" of
decline and decay, it tended toward longevity. In short, its strength was
stability. 158
149. 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 64, I1.7.1279a30-.1279a35, at 2030.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. III.7.1279b4-.1279b5, at 2030.
153. See id. III.9.1280a8-10.1281a39, at 2031-33 (arguing that rule by the rich distinguishes oli-
garchy from democracy).
154. See id. 1ll.11.1281a40-.1282a41, at 2033-35.
155. POLYBIUS, THE HISTORIES, V1.3 (arguing that the best constitution is one that combines a
kingship, an aristocracy, and a democracy). Aristotle's flirtation was less with a mixed form per se
than with a single form that combined various social elements. See, e.g., 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 64,
IV.7.1293b15-.1293b20, at 2053.
156. See POLYBIUS, supra note 155, VI.3.
157. See id. V11.
158. See id. V1.3-4.
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Much later, Montesquieu also celebrated the mixed constitution; its
principal virtue for him, however, was not stability but liberty. 59 As
Polybius had Rome, Montesquieu too had his exemplar-in England. 6
The idea behind English institutions, as Blackstone put it, was a single
system that combined all the desirable Aristotelian forms: monarchy (a
variation on Aristotle's kingship, in the Crown), aristocracy (in the House
of Lords), and polity (in the House of Commons).' 6 ' The aristocracy
was the perfect fulcrum, preventing each of the others from tending to its
pernicious extreme-monarchy to tyranny and polity to mob rule. 62 The
others, in turn, prevented aristocracy from becoming what Aristotle called
oligarchy. The result, said Blackstone (and Montesquieu), was English
liberty.63
Colonists celebrated English liberty and Blackstone's account of
balance, but therein lay the problem, for the social and political order of
the colonies was different from that of England. The Crown was present
in the persons of royal governors, and the people were present in colonial
legislatures. But aristocracy was absent, at least as a formally recognized
social institution with a distinct political function. Even before the
Revolution, some colonists sensed the problem and proposed to solve it by
creating not a hereditary nobility but an uninheritable "nobility for
life.""'4 This, proponents claimed, would secure a "social basis for
constitutional balance." 65 The idea was controversial in its time, but the
democratic forces later unleashed by the Revolution made it downright
insensible. Still, absent Crown and aristocracy in the wake of separation,
where would balance come from?' 66
The answer was not clear. One thing that made the absence of for-
mally instituted privileged orders, and therefore the idea of popular
government, less problematic in America was what McDonald calls "the
stabilizing effects of extragovernmental institutions and forces," including
the family. 67 Thomas Jefferson thought something more was needed.
He imagined a feeble state, whose weakness would guarantee a kind of
159. See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 81, at 151-62.
160. See id. at 151.
161. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *50-52.
162. See id.; BAILYN, supra note 76, at 273-74.
163. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *50-52; MONTESQUIEU, supra note 81, at 151;
BAILYN, supra note 90, at 20-23. In the last work, Bailyn says Blackstone's account was "misleading"
as an explanation of "the actual working of English government." Id. at 23. One can accept Bailyn's
point and nonetheless appreciate the importance of the idea-however misguided-to colonial concep-
tions of the proper structure and function of government.
164. BAILYN, supra note 76, at 278.
165. Id. at 279.
166. See id. at 274-81.
167. McDONALD, supra note 115, at 160-61.
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liberty, combined with a "natural aristocracy," whose benevolent guidance
would ensure good order and thus mitigate what he perceived to be the
dangers of democracy. 168 Putting to one side the obvious tensions in
Jefferson's thought, expecting social institutions alone to maintain an
acceptable balance between order and liberty-especially an institution
smacking of aristocracy, but even institutions like church, family, and
community-was probably unrealistic. This was particularly so if
"government" connoted not merely the inheritors of colonial administration
but also a new nation-state. The territorial scope of a national state would
require powers sufficient not only to carry out whatever duties the nation
might have, but also to resist many of the centrifugal forces that a state of
such size could produce. So substantial a government might overwhelm
mere informal institutions whose range of influence in any event would
tend to be local.
If the Constitution did anything, it supplied the design for a nation-
state. Its familiar answer to the question of balance borrowed from
Blackstone, but owed a deeper debt to Montesquieu, who exalted the sep-
aration of governmental functions into distinct legislative, executive, and
judicial departments that shared powers with one another.'69 This separa-
tion of functions, in fact, permitted a kind of marriage of Aristotle to
Montesquieu. With a twist, each of Aristotle's desirable constitutions was
present in its own department: monarchy in the executive, polity in the
House of Representatives, and aristocracy in the judiciary. 70 The twist
168. See RICHARD K. MATrHEWS, THE RADICAL POLITICS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON: A
REVISIONIST VIEW 122 (1984) (describing Jefferson as a communitarian anarchist). Jefferson never
relinquished the notion that a natural aristocracy was crucial to human progress. See Letter from
Thomas Jefferson to John Adams (Oct. 28, 1813), in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 1304, 1306
(Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984) ("The natural aristocracy I consider as the most precious gift of nature
for the instruction, the trusts, and government of society").
169. As noted above, Blackstone located the three forms of rule (or social classes) within Crown
and Parliament. One thing that made this arrangement significant was the absence of a "constitutional"
place for the judiciary. The upshot of the arrangement was parliamentary supremacy, which Blackstone
explicitly embraced. See I BLACKSTONE, supra note 76, at *91 ("But if the parliament will positively
enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I know of no power that can control it.").
Montesquieu, in contrast, emphasized the need to keep the three governmental functions-executive,
legislative, and (especially) judicial-distinct and separate, each with its own domain of power. See
MONTESQUIEU, sapra note 81, at 151-62.
170. Granted, no supporter of the Constitution would have conceded the prcsence of aristocratic
or monarchic forms in the proposed government. In fact, Hamilton disavowed the monarchic character-
istics of the executive, see THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 423-31 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961), though he praised the judiciary in terms evocative of Thomas Jefferson's natural
aristocracy. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961). Antifederalists, on the other hand, were quick to point out-and criticize-what they considered
the aristocratic and monarchic elements of the Constitution. See, e.g., George Clinton, Letters of
"Cato," No. VI (Dec. 16, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966),
at 312, 316-17 (arguing that the President and the Senate will combine against the representatives to
strangle liberties in the United States); Richard Henry Lee, Letters from the Federal Farmer, No. HI
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was that the states, which had inherited colonial authority, were also
represented in the Senate. The result was a strange new oxymoronic
contraption-a confederated national democratic republic.
B. The Constitution
In theory, the contraption was "a machine that would go of
itself,"'' and the Constitution's incongruous ingenuity would hold in
abeyance a range of worries about explicitly maintaining a social basis for
constitutional balance. But this mechanistic account disguised a number of
ways in which the Constitution was not simply a political apparatus; or, if
it were, it presupposed a particular sort of society to make it work. No
one can read Madison's treatment of class-based social divisions in The
Federalist Nos. 10" and 39,73 and fail to appreciate the relevance of
social structure to the proper operation of the new regime.
Family was integral to the presumed social structure. At one point in
The Federalist No. 14, Madison even insisted that the nation itself was a
family: "Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people
of America, knit together as they are by so many chords of affection, can
no longer live together as members of the same family ... .
Perhaps because the familial metaphor was archaic, simply implausible, or
implicitly threatening to the preserves of power jealously guarded by the
separate states, this was the only time we see Filmer's metaphor at work
in The Federalist.
(Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra, 215, 220, 216-20 ("[When we examine
the powers ... of the executive, we shall perceive that the general government ... will have a strong
tendency to aristocracy .... "); George Mason, Objections of the Proposed Federal Constitution (Oct.
7, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra, 191, 195, 192-95 ("[lIt is at present impossible
to foresee whether [the Constitution] will, in its operation, produce a monarchy, or a corrupt oppressive
aristocracy; it will most probably vibrate some years between the two, and then terminate in the one
or the other."); Letters of "Centinel," No. I (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra,
at 3, 7, 12-14 (arguing against equal representation of states in the Senate and the presidential power
to pardon); Letters of "Centinel,"No. III (Nov. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra,
at 15, 18, 17-19 (contending that the national government would be constructed "on the most unequal
principles, destitute of accountability to its constituents"); Letters of "John DeWitt," No. III (Nov. 5,
1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra, 102, 105, 103-06 (noting that the Senate would be
the "Aristocratical" branch and the executive the "Monarchical" branch of the proposed government);
Letter of "Montezuma" (Oct. 17, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra, 61, 66, 61-67
("[T]his constitution is calculated to restrain the influence and the power of the LOWER CLASS."
(emphasis in original)).
171. Michael Kammen traces this particular phrase to James Russell Lowell's address to the
Reform Club of New York in 1888, but emphasizes that the metaphor of Constitution as machine had
roots extending back to the founding. See KAMMEN, supra note 86, at 17-19.
172. TIE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78-79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossitered., 1961) (explaining
the roots of "faction" in, among other things, "the various and unequal distribution of property").
173. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 241 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (defining an
essential characteristic of a republic to be that the members of the government "be derived from the
great body of society, not from an inconsiderable proportion or a favored class of it").
174. THE FEDERALIST No. 14, at 103 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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In fact, contrary to Madison's happy invocation of familial harmony,
several of The Federalist's essays worry that the family-as a social
institution, not a rhetorical prop-was a serious problem for political
societies. John Jay was the first to raise the issue, in his discussion of
national defense. As Paine had observed the previous decade, Jay noted
that "absolute monarchs" are often persuaded to go to war for reasons of
purely personal ambition, including aggrandizing "their particular
families," even "when their nations are to get nothing by it."" 5 This
observation implied two worries. The first, which formed Jay's primary
concern, was that the United States be strong enough to defend against
such predators. 176 The second, which related more directly to Hamilton's
and Madison's preoccupations, was how to create a system in which per-
sonal or familial ambition did not subvert the welfare of the nation.
This latter concern drew strength from the fact that waging war was
not the only danger familial ambition might pose for a polity. Family ties
could also engender corruption, which was perilous especially in interna-
tional relations-as in the case of a president's making treaties or
appointing ambassadors to benefit himself and his family-but even in the
appointment of executive officers having no direct connection to interna-
tional affairs.
177
Jay suggested that the solution was to ensure that the "private
interests" of the executive were "[in]distinct from that of the nation. "178
In truth, however, this community of interest was not entirely feasible on
republican terms. Worse, moreover, it uncomfortably seemed to evoke a
type of regime in which the executive's interest was, by definition, the
interest of the nation, as when Louis XIV proclaimed (perhaps
apocryphally), "L'Etat, c'est moi. 171
Thus, the more plausible solution, at least for a republican polity that
might be able to rely consistently on the moral virtue or statesmanship of
its citizens or leaders, was one of institutional design. First, divide power
among independent departments so that legislative power, for example, did
175. THE FEDERALIST No. 4, at 46 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
176. See id. at 48-49.
177. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 64, at 395 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing that
corruption would be improbable because ratification of a treaty requires the support of the President
and two-thirds of the Senate); THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at457 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961) (noting that the Senate's approval power over presidential nominations would serve as a
check on corruption).
178. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64, supra note 177, at 395 (John Jay).
179. For a claim that, if Louis XIV never made the statement, he might as well have done so, see
CRANE BRINTON Er AL., A HISTORY OF CIVILIZATION: PREHISTORY TO 1715, at 399 (5th ed. 1976).
Louis's successor, Louis XV, would insist (not apocryphally): "It is in my sole person that sovereign
authority resides." R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO WESTERN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 98 (1995).
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not reside solely in the legislature, but was shared by the executive, and
vice versa. (The judiciary-its place and function-was arguably a special
case.) One way of doing this was to give the legislature, specifically the
Senate, some meaningful say over the adoption of treaties and the
appointment of ambassadors and certain other executive officers. This kind
of check would harness ambition by structurally confining it and depersona-
lize national policy and international relations by abstracting them from the
parochial interest of person or family."s In Hamilton's words, this
architectural design would preclude "a monopoly of all the principal
employments of the government in a few families, and [thus preclude]...
an aristocracy or an oligarchy."'
8'
Second, design a system of representation in the legislature that would
expand the range of interests to which any single member was accountable.
The devices for achieving this goal were to (1) carefully calibrate the size
of districts,"s (2) maintain a system of regular elections," 3 and (3)
ensure that eligibility for office was not confined "to persons of particular
families or fortunes."" Thus, the polity would reduce the risk of
captivity to selfish personal interest or narrow familial tie.
Third, and to perfect the foregoing changes, abolish hereditary social
status within institutions of government. Hence, the Constitution prohibi-
ted the United States from granting titles of nobility and barred national
governmental officials from accepting any title or office from a foreign
prince or state, unless (in the latter case) the Congress consents; 185 it
further prohibited states from granting titles of nobility.'86
Article IV's direction that "[t]he United States shall guarantee to every
State in this Union a Republican Form of Government"" s was to similar
but more systematic effect. McDonald claims that there was some dis-
agreement over the meaning of "republican," with Hamilton insisting it
meant the prohibition of hereditary status and Madison arguing that it
connoted a government whose power derived from the consent of the
people.' In fact, as Hamilton's and Madison's contributions to The
Federalist indicate, establishing representative democracy and abolishing
hereditary status were merely two sides of the same coin; both were
180. See THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 177, at 457 (Alexander Hamilton).
181. THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 462 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
182. See THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 354 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
183. See id. at 352 (observing that "the restraint of frequent elections" is necessary to effectuate
other devices for representational accountability).
184. Id. at 353.
185. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cf. 8.
186. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
187. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4.
188. See McDONALD, supra note 115, at 5.
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fundamental principles of republican government and aimed at the same
basic goal: liberty."9
Finally, the Constitution also addressed the imposition of hereditary
penalties through forfeiture and attainder, as in the English system. 9
Essentially, this provision lifted the intergenerational curse that corruption
of blood had inflicted under English, colonial, and American law.'9'
Notwithstanding the explicit and implicit bans on inherited status and
punishment, there were two prominent exceptions. The first was the provi-
sion restricting eligibility for the office of President to "natural born"
citizens, thus making the office an inchoate but hereditary privilege of the
native population. 92 The second was the institution of slavery, which
not only belied the prohibition of hereditary status but implicated the family
in other subtle and peculiar ways. "
These exceptions aside, the Constitution addressed the very dangers
of family and hereditary status for which Paine had lambasted the ancien
regime. Proponents of the Constitution also imagined, however, that
family-specifically, the American version of family-not only was not
dangerous, but would actually advance the structure and operation of the
proposed system, or at least would mitigate fears about its structure and
operation. 194  One pronounced fear-especially among Antifederalist
opponents of the Constitution-was that, notwithstanding the baroque
arrangement of power among departments, the national government would
be so powerful it would overwhelm the states' prerogatives and the
people's liberty. 19 In part because of recent experience, both colonial
189. For Madison's understanding of the normative and institutional requirements of republican
government, see THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 14, 37, 39, 43, 49, 51, 52, 55, 57, 62 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For Hamilton's contributions, see THE FEDERALIST NOs. 9, 22, 28, 34,
68, 70, 71, 77, 78, 83 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
190. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. The Framers explicitly rejected such penalties, providing as
follows: "The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of
Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted."
Id.
191. See supra notes 142-44 and accompanying text.
192. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 1, cl. 5. That section contains an exemption for persons who were
United States citizens "at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution." Id.
193. The problem of slavery is relevant to the issues with which I am concerned in a larger project
on the constitutional status of the family; however, it is beyond the scope of this Essay. For a percep-
tive treatment of the intersection of the U.S. Constitution, family, and slavery, see PEGGY COOPER
DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 29-35 (1997).
194. See supra notes 184-91 and accompanying text.
195. See Letter from Philadelphiensis to His Fellow Citizens (Feb. 7, 1788) ("[U]nder the
proposed plan of government the least fragment of liberty cannot exist."), reprinted in THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 170, at 69, 71; The Pennsylvania Minority, The Address and Reasons
of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of Pennsylvania to Their Constituents (Dec.
12, 1787) ("The legislative power vested in Congress ... is so unlimited in its nature ... that this
alone would be amply sufficient to annihilate the State governments .... "), reprinted in THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 170, at 27, 45.
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and revolutionary, the relation between liberty and states was clear and
comprehensible. States were forums for dealing with most of the important
political questions of the day. States (and communities) were where people
exercised their ancient liberty to govern themselves. And people increas-
ingly perceived the states as fortifications against the oppression of a distant
central power and thus as institutional guarantors of both ancient liberty
and an emerging kind of modem liberty. 1
96
What might protect against national encroachment on these interests?
The answer given by proponents of the Constitution was complex and in
some respects confusing. But part of their answer relied upon the ties of
affection and kinship that resided in family and community. Hamilton put
the claim this way:
It is a known fact in human nature that its affections are
commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the
object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his
family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the
community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a
stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the
government of the Union .... 9
Madison later made a strikingly similar claim.198
This picture of an organic hierarchy of human attachments borrowed
from Aristotle' 99 and Cicero, 2° both of whom had depicted the relation
196. See The Political Thought of the Antifederalists, reprinted in Introduction, THE
ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 170, at xxxix-xli (explaining the Antifederalists's belief that republican
government could succeed only in small political units); see also HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE
ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 15-7, at 69 (1981) ("The Antifederalists's defense of federalism and of
the primacy of the states rested on their belief that there was an inherent connection between the states
and the preservation of individual liberty."). But see WOOD, supra note 24, at 563-64, 519-24 (noting
the Antifederalists's worry that the Constitution of 1787 marked a sharp break with revolutionary
ideology, especially in its delegation of executive powers to a single president and its aggrandizement
of national power).
197. THE FEDERALIST No. 17, at 119 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
198. In early 1788, Madison wrote:
[The first and most natural attachment of the people will be to the governments of their
respective States.... And with the members of these [States], will a greater proportion
of the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family and
party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected
most strongly to incline.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 294-95 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
199. Aristotle famously claimed that the state is the natural extension and highest form of human
sociability. See 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 64, I.1.1252al-.1253a4, at 1986-87. In his hierarchy, human
association begins with the procreative relation between man and woman and the economic relation
between master and slave. See id. I.2.1252bl-.1252bl8, at 1987. Those pairs become the household.
See d. The coalition of a number of households, in turn, forms the village. See id. And "[t]he final
association, formed of several villages, is the state." Id. I.2.1252b28-.1252b30, at 1987.
200. See CICERO, DE OFFICIIS I.xvii.58, at 61 (Walter Miller trans., W.M. Heinemann Ltd.
1956). Cicero set out this hierarchy as follows:
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between family and polity as happy and harmonious. Indeed, the bonds
engendered in familial settings were essential to sustaining politics.
Aristotle insisted, however, that the harmony should not be too close. For
one thing, familial authority was not identical to political authority. Thus,
family was not simply a little polity to which the rules of politics applied.
Familial authority was different."z ' For another thing, it was positively
dangerous to try to unify family and state. "Plurality," as Aristotle called
it, was crucial to the success of a well-run state, and the unity of family
and state undermined plurality.2' Family, therefore, required a separate
space.'z 3 Nonetheless, Cicero could claim that the home-understood as
the center of reproductive life, in which all things were in common-was
"the foundation of civil government, the nursery, as it were, of the
state."'  Moreover, he observed, the intensity of human attachment was
stronger the closer one moved to the center of human society-the home-
and dissipated the farther one moved from that center. 5
Hamilton and Madison exploited these insights to craft an innovation
that was especially useful in light of American conditions. The innovation
was to argue that the institution of the family could reinforce the status of
the states-which many opponents of the Constitution exalted-and protect
against encroachments by the nation-which all opponents of the
Constitution feared. This claim was significant for constitutionalism,
because it imagined for family a practical role in limiting power within a
geographically expansive regime.
V. Constitutionalism, Family, and Change
This new role for family, as Hamilton and Madison imagined it, was
essentially preservationist; that is, it aimed at maintaining a particular type
of political order, which they called "republican." Ironically, however,
Now, if a contrast and comparison were to be made to find out where most of our moral
obligation is due, country would come first, and parents;... next come children and the
whole family, who look to us alone for support and can have no other protection; finally,
our kinsmen, with whom we live on good terms and with whom, for the most part, our
lot is one.
Id. at I.xlv.160, at 163 ("Our first duty is to the immortal gods; our second, to country; our third, to
parents; and so on, in a descending scale, to the rest.").
201. See 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 64, I.7.1255b18-.1255b39, at 1992 (describing familial
authority as akin to a monarchy); see also ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.6.1134b10-.1134b11
(Martin Ostwald ed. & trans., MacMillan 1986) ("What is just for the master of a slave and just for
a father is similar to, but not identical with, the politically just.").
202. See 2 ARISTOTLE, supra note 64, II.2.1261a17-.1261a22, at 2001.
203. See id. II.2.1261a16-. I262b36, at2001-04. Suggestively, Aristotle's discussion of a separate
space for family introduced his treatment of private ownership of property. See id. II.1-5.1264al-
.1264b25, at 2001-06.
204. CICERO, supra note 200, I.xvii.54, at 53.
205. See id. I.xvii.53-.58, at 57-61.
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this role was linked both historically and conceptually to another, which
was radically transformative. Locke had justified the latter role. Colonial
experience had demonstrated it.
Locke understood that one of the basic and enduring problems of
politics was constraining and directing political power. Specifically, in his
terms, power should be constrained against arbitrariness and directed to the
common good.' His solution to that problem was complex, involving
natural rights, majoritarianism, and rule of law, among other things. We
need not pause over these particulars, nor need we worry now about the
merits of Lockean liberalism in general. The more pertinent concern is
Locke's notion that the people possess residual powers to declare govern-
ment dissolved and to replace it with a new one more consistent with their
needs.2 7  By maintaining the threat of dissolution-and, of course, by
implementing it-the people's residual powers could help sustain limits.
And to the extent that attentive and self-interested people presided over the
rites of dissolution and replacement (or, in biblical terms, of destruction
and creation), they could help direct political power toward the common
good.
From the standpoint of constitutionalism, the powers to destroy and
create are crucial. In practical terms, if people are to exercise these
powers, they must, at a minimum, be able to imagine new ways-both nor-
mative and institutional-of ordering their political world(s). This capacity
in turn presumes that people possess, at a minimum, intellectual and ethical
resources independent from the ruler or state. In other words, people must
be able to be not merely good citizens but also anti-citizens-or, more
accurately, anti-statists-when circumstances require. They must be able
to dismantle existing arrangements and replace them, perhaps with some-
thing radically new, perhaps with something that attempts to recapture or
reinforce values or institutions that are lost or waning. Finally, in order
to perform these roles, people must be able to occupy meaningful spaces
that are partially autonomous from the state.
In a complex and highly differentiated society-especially one of
liberal orientation-there may be many such spaces, though they tend to be
diffuse, and one's contact with them can be fleeting. Perhaps because of
those conditions, the institutions that are politically most useful are ones
that are protected by constitutional design against substantial interference
from the state. The Constitution of the United States explicitly carves out
space for a few such institutions. Private ownership of property, for
example, can contribute to individuals' sense of security and well-being,
promote material prosperity, and engender the independence that citizens
206. See LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE, supra note 37, §§ 123-131.
207. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
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need to make reflective, noncoerced political judgments. Property's
autonomy is now so ingrained in the American polity that it requires little
judicial solicitude fbr its protection. This is especially true of capital
enterprise, which, despite its undeniable contributions to prosperity, has
frequently threatened both individual security and collective capacities for
reflective self-government." °
The press-or "the media" as it is known today-is another such
institution. Its most serious function is educative, primarily with respect
to current affairs. At its best, it supplies information by which people may
manage their own affairs and critically evaluate (perhaps even participate
in) governmental decisions. Problematically, the diversity and indepen-
dence of the press-and hence its usefulness-have suffered from its con-
quest by monied interests.2' It does not require a keen eye (or ear) to
recognize the presently debased condition of the visual (and auditory)
media.
Religion is still another institution. Its primary function is moral, and
its sites are typically communal. When religion is vigorous, therefbre, it
provides a place in which people may create and participate in distinct
ways of life. As with property and the press, however, developments in
the United States have weakened religion's constitutionalist utility. The
208. The Supreme Court's decisions treating for-profit corporations as persons and treating money
as speech are progenitors of perverse and debilitating effects of monied enterprise on politics. On the
constitutional status of corporations, see Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898) (holding that "a
railroad corporation is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment['s]" Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses) and Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, 396
(1886). Cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244-45 (1936) (holding that a corporation
is not a "citizen" within the meaning of the Privileges and Immunities Clause but is a "person" within
the meaning of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses). On corporations and money in the
electoral process, see Federal Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee, 470 U.S. 480,482-83 (1985) (declaring a limit on campaign contributions unconstitutional);
First National Bank v. Bellouti, 435 U.S. 765,767 (1978) (holding a law prohibiting corporate contribu-
tions to referenda unconstitutional); and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976) (concluding that
limitations on both campaign contributions and expenditures "implicate fundamental First Amendment
interests"). Cf. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652,654-55 (1990) (concluding
that a law "prohibit[ing] corporations from using corporate treasury funds for independent expenditures
in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in election for state office is constitutional because the
provision is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
209. On the autonomy of the press, see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
245-48 (1974) (declaring unconstitutional a Florida statute requiring newspapers to print political
responses because it represented a governmental "intrusion into the function of editors") and Grosjean,
297 U.S. at 245-50 (holding that the First Amendment protects the press from punitive taxation, not
just from the prior regulation of content). On the problems associated with the marriage of money to
media, see Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 250, 247-54 (observing that the expense of modem publishing
places "in a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion"). Cf.
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101, 104 (1973) (noting that
the scarcity of frequencies prevents some interested parties from broadcasting). See generally OWEN
FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH (1996) (arguing for governmental intervention to protect the demo-
cratic purpose of the First Amendment).
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Supreme Court has so narrowly construed "free exercise," for example,
that the constitutional principle now boils down to a simple maxim: Believe
what you will, but behave as the state generally commands. 210  The
logical consequences of this position are to standardize modes of worship
and to convert much of religion into a system of creeds. In short, the
tendency is to make religion's protected domain a matter strictly of indi-
vidual belief instead of a way of life.2 '
Finally, federalism, which presumes a domain for politics in states and
localities, is another example, although it is less antistatist than antination-
statist. That is, its function is less to transform than to preserve a political
arrangement that resists the imposition of certain sorts of policy from
above. It permits a diffusion of values and provides enclaves in which
people may authorize or modify those values. In its most vigorous
iterations, it acts as a kind of geographically grounded multiculturalism.
Even federalism, however, has fallen on hard times in the United States,
especially since the middle of the twentieth century. It not only has
acquired-sometimes earned-a bad reputation with respect to civil
liberties, but also is approaching obsolescence with respect to many
important functions.1
210. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 885 (1990) (holding that the Free
Exercise Clause does not excuse the respondent from compliance with laws prohibiting the use of
peyote). This case reflects the approach of Justice Frankfurter's dissent in West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnene, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Justice Frankfurter insisted:
Law is concerned with external behavior and not with the inner life of man. It rests in
large measure upon compulsion. Socrates lives in history partly because he gave his life
for the conviction that duty of obedience to secular law does not presuppose consent to
its enactment or belief in its virtue.
Id. at 655 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997)
(citing Smith for the proposition that an individual has an obligation to obey the law regardless of his
religious beliefs).
211. But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (holding that Wisconsin's compulsory
education law violated the free exercise rights of Amish families). In the context of later cases, Yoder
appears to be anomalous, notwithstanding Justice Scalia's insistence that the holding in Yoder is
consistent with his opinion for the Court in Smith. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. Scalia notes that:
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of
a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the
Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other
Constitutional protections, such as... the right of parents to... direct the education of
their children.
Id. at 881.
212. It is beyond the scope of this Essay to explain or to explore in detail the demise of federalism
in the United States. Sheldon Wolin traces the trend to the constitutional founding of the United States.
At that time, he says, a nationalist ethos was built into the logic of the constitutional order, embodied
in the person of Alexander Hamilton. See Sheldon Wolin, The People's Two Bodies, I DEMOCRACY
9, 14-16 (1981). This ethos led inexorably to the unchallenged supremacy of the nation-state-Wolin
calls it the "imperial" state-and the impoverishment of local democratic politics. Id. at 17. I suspect
that Wolin overreaches in suggesting a singular genetic logic to the Constitution; it does seem accurate,
however, that a nation-statist logic triumphed by the end of the nineteenth century and became
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Because of the weakness or perversity of these institutions in their
present state, there may be constitutionalist reasons to look for another
institution capable of performing a transformative role. But does it make
sense to consider the family to be such an institution? One difficulty with
this view is that, unlike property, the press, religion, or even federalism,
family lacks substantial support from the constitutional text. Although the
Constitution does speak to family,213 it does so primarily by rejecting old
forms that were incompatible with republicanism. If we can take Hamilton
and Madison seriously, the modem family was presumed to be an affirma-
tive part of the new order, even if the text were largely silent. As an
interpretive matter, however, the constitutional status of family arises (if
at all) less from text or intentions than from inferences drawn from the
character and logical relations among other institutions and values.1l
This is partly a question of constitutional theory, a la Locke, and partly a
pragmatic concern, as demonstrated by colonial experience. But it is also
a question of the specific functions that family might perform.
As it happens, the various specific functions of family closely
resemble those of property, the press, religion, and federalism. Like
ownership of property, family can contribute to psychic and material
security and independence; and, as a kind of economic enterprise, it can
promote prosperity. Like the press, it can perform an important educative
function. Even more than most modern modes of religion, family serves
as a site for regularly resolving practical moral problems; the sum and
substance of those resolutions can constitute a way of life. Like federalism
but with a greater transformative capacity, family's performance of these
functions can foster diversity-Aristotle's "plurality"-with respect to
resources, knowledge, and values. Something like these functions is
reflected in Justice O'Connor's treatment of marriage in Turner v.
Safley,2 5 in which the Court struck down restrictions on the ability of
prison inmates to marry.216 The marital relation, she wrote, serves as an
entrenched by the middle of the twentieth. The sources for this triumph are complex. Some are quite
noble, others less so. If I may be permitted room for historical speculation, it strikes me that the
sources include the following: (1) the material, institutional, and normative demands of capitalism; (2)
reaction to the Civil War's challenge to the survival of "the Union"; (3) the political crisis precipitated
by the fear of annihilation by global communism; and (4) various political and ethical challenges-
including slavery, civil rights for African Americans, and the status of women-that have drawn on
national power for their solution. For a claim that states should reclaim some of their lost authority
with respect to constitutional interpretation, see WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND
POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 239-74 (1996).
213. See supra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
214. For examples of and a justification for this interpretive method, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
215. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
216. Id. at 100.
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"expressionol of emotional support and public commitment."2"7  It pos-
sesses "spiritual significance."2"' It promises the possibility of sexual
union. Finally, it is "a precondition" to many forms of economic
advantage.21 9
Turner, of course, was not the first decision to affirm the constitu-
tional significance of the family. In this century, one of the earliest
indications of the Court's commitment to the family was Meyer v.
Nebraska.' Justice McReynolds, writing for the Court, held that a state
may not prohibit teaching students in or of a foreign language, even though
the students are young and impressionable."2 On its facts, the decision
might well have implicated some theory of religious liberty or academic
freedom. McReynolds, however, treated the case as revolving instead
around the autonomy of family and the authority of parents to make deci-
sions about rearing and educating their children.'
Plato envisioned, McReynolds wrote, an "Ideal Commonwealth" in
which "'the wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children
are to be common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child
his parent."'" Moreover, Sparta had attempted "to submerge the indi-
vidual and develop ideal citizens" by gathering up young males, placing
them in barracks, and "intrust[ing] their subsequent education and training
to official guardians." 4 McReynolds argued that such arrangements,
however, are "wholly different from those upon which our institutions rest;
and it will hardly be affirmed that any legislature could impose such
restrictions upon the people of a State without doing violence to both letter
and spirit of the Constitution."'
One might speculate about the psycho-sexual roots of McReynolds's
antipathy toward wives and children held in common. '6 One might also
wonder precisely what the "letter . . . of the Constitution" might tell us
about the claims he makes. Moreover, the implication that regulating the
217. Id. at 95.
218. Id. at 96.
219. Id.
220. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
221. Id. at 401, 403.
222. Id. at 400 ("Corresponding to the right of control, it is the natural duty of the parent to give
his children education suitable to their station in life; and nearly all States, including Nebraska, enforce
this obligation by compulsory laws.").
223. Id. at 401-02 (quoting PLATO, THE REPUBLIC, book V. 457d (Ralph Barton Perry ed.,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928)).
224. Id. at 402.
225. Id.
226. Susan Moller Okin, for example, argues that (1) a desire to hold women as a kind of
property, and (2) the specter of sexual equality have made men distrustful of the abolition of family in
Plato's guardian class. See Susan Moller Okin, Philosopher Queens and Private Wives: Plato on
Women and the Family, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 345, 349-59 (1977).
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teaching of foreign language is analogous to rounding up children and
raising them on a state-run commune is, to press the point gently,
exaggerated. Nonetheless, McReynolds's opinion contained the kernel of
a basic constitutionalist insight.
He exploited that insight two years later in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,27 explaining:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments
in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State;
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations. 28
Certainly, there is more than one way to conceive the ground for this
position. McReynolds himself probably understood the position as
serving-and preserving-liberal capitalism and some version of
"traditional" family values. 9  Others have claimed the position under-
writes a conception of human dignity, which lies at the heart of American,
and perhaps universal, political morality."0
But the constitutionalist perspective differs from both of these
understandings, for it sees the primary issue in both cases to be the danger
of the state's "over-constituting" civil society and thus threatening to
undermine a basic precondition for constitutionalist politics. Over-
constitution may take many forms. In Buck v. Bell" l and Skinner v.
Oklahoma,2 the constitutionalist danger was the state's arrogation of
control of the genetic constitution of society. 3 In Meyer and Pierce, the
danger was the state's attempt to control the "intellectual and ethical DNA"
of civil society. Thus, the question of both Pierce and Meyer was larger
than whether education may be public or private or whether the state may
regulate educational curriculum in certain ways. The question concerned
227. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). Pierce involved a challenge to an Oregon state requirement that
children between the ages of eight and sixteen be educated in public schools. Id. at 530.
228. Id. at 535.
229. On McReynolds's commitment to capital and to children, see OXFORD COMPANION, supra
note 5, at 542-43.
230. See, e.g., Walter F. Murphy, An Ordering of Constitutional Values, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 703,
705-08, 744-54 (1980).
231. 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
232. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
233. See Buck, 274 U.S. at 201,207 (upholding a law that permitted the compulsory sterilization
of a retarded woman); Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536, 541 (declaring unconstitutional an Oklahoma law
which allowed habitual criminals to be sterilized). This consideration may also apply to the Court's
decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a law which prohibited interracial
marriage), given the state's biologically racialist justification for its prohibition of miscegenation. Id.
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the places from (or within) which people come to see and evaluate-and
thus to embrace or modify or reject-their political world. These places
can also help perform the constitutionally significant job of mediating the
relation between individual on the one hand and collective or state on the
other.23
4
Later decisions of the Court have tended not to embrace a transforma-
tive understanding of family, but instead have gravitated toward a
preservationist view and frequently, like Filmer, a5 have relied on
"tradition" to supply an account of the form and content of family.23
6
One of the more muscular examples of this traditionalist approach to
constitutional interpretation is Justice Scalia's opinion in Michael H. v.
Gerald D.,7 which held that family (of a type) was not an autonomous
domain, but a realm for intensive regulation by the state."3 Scalia
directly invoked Medieval English notions of family. On his reading of the
English cases and treatises, the only form of family with a constitutionally
protected status was the state-sanctioned marital family.3 9
American colonial experience partly belied Justice Scalia's tradition-
alist aspiration and preservationist emphasis. For one thing, that
experience-as well as the Revolution it precipitated and the Constitution
itself-explicitly rejected English notions of family. For another, even if
some aspect of the English family survived in the colonies, the family's
function at the founding was transformative, not simply preservationist.
Scalia might well acknowledge those facts, but urge that once republican
forms of government were established in the English-speaking confines of
North America, a particular form of family-modem, marital, nuclear, and
state-sanctioned-was built into the logic of the order, and its function
234. Consider, for example, the anti-statist claims of children and their parents in Minersville
School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), and West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
235. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
236. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (proclaiming that a right of
privacy in marriage antedates even the Bill of Rights); id. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (arguing
that the Fourteenth and Ninth Amendments protect liberties that are fundamental because, inter alia,
they are part of the country's "traditions" and "experience"); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects those
liberties rooted in the traditions of the country, including the right of a married couple to use birth
control); cf. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504 (1977) (holding that the notion of
traditional family includes extended relatives); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (holding
that the decision to marry is protected by the same right of privacy that protects decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and familial relationships).
237. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia wrote for a plurality of four, except
as to his account of tradition, which only he and Chief Justice Rehnquist embraced. See id. at 127 n.6
(plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 126-27 (plurality opinion).
239. Id. at 124-25 (plurality opinion) (discussing the common law's presumption of legitimacy for
children born in wedlock).
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became fundamentally preservationist. There might be much to such a
claim, and a comprehensive response to it is beyond the scope of this
Essay. Suffice it for now to say that the American secession from Britain
may suggest another lesson that, for better or worse, undercuts Scalia's
expectation: Under certain conditions of liberty, it will be difficult, if not
impossible, for government to determine family's form or protect itself
against normative innovations that might grow out of revised familial
relations. An autonomous family is a potentially dangerous source for new
values and new ways of life.
